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I witnessed SGT [REDACTED] placing lotion in her hand and 
touching a detainee.  She was whispering in the detainee’s ear as 
her hand traveled to the detainee’s lap.  I didn’t see her hands 
(because her body obstructed my view) touch the detainee’s 
groin, but the detainee started to grimace in pain.  Later, a Ma-
rine told me that SGT [REDACTED] bent the detainee’s thumbs 
back.  He went on to say that “if you think that this is bad, she has 
done worse.”
1
 
 
 [The Government’s investigation] found no evidence of torture 
or inhumane treatment at JTF-GTMO.
2
 
 
 * Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, and Director, Seton Hall Uni-
versity School of Law Center for Policy and Research.  The Report also benefited 
from the research and contributions of Grace Byrd, Adam Deutsch, Douglas Eadie,  
Jennifer Ellick, Deborah Fish, Christopher Fox, Jillian Gautier, Gabrielle Hughes, 
Daniel Lorenzo, Mark Muoio, Michael Patterson, Courtney Ray, Paul Taylor, and 
Lauren Winchester. 
 ** Partner, Denbeaux & Denbeaux.  Co-authors Professors Mark Denbeaux and 
Joshua Denbeaux represent two Guantánamo detainees. 
 1 Letter from T.J. Harrington, Deputy Assistant Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investiga-
tion, to Donald J. Ryder, Major Gen., U.S. Army (July 14, 2004)[hereinafter Harring-
ton Letter] (alterations in original), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI_4622_4624.pdf. 
 2 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ARMY REGULATION 15-6: FINAL REPORT, INVESTIGATION INTO 
FBI ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT GUANTÁNAMO BAY, CUBA DETENTION FACILITY 
DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX_TORTURE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2011  2:38 PM 
1320 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1319 
I. METHODOLOGY 
This Report explains how senior officials at the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense (DOD) re-
sponded to the numerous reports filed by FBI agents in response to 
improper techniques used by DOD interrogators at Guantánamo Bay.  
The present Report does not attempt to present a complete picture 
of all interrogation techniques actually used at Guantánamo.  Rather, 
this Report presents only those techniques described by FBI field 
agents in their own reports.  The reviewed agents’ reports are from 
three sources: (1) unsolicited reports received by senior FBI officials 
prior to 2004, (2) solicited reports sent to senior FBI officials in 2004 
pursuant to an FBI directive, and (3) notes compiled from the 
Schmidt-Furlow investigation of detainee abuse at Guantánamo
3
 and 
labeled in the appendix to the investigation report—“Investigation 
into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba De-
tention Facility” (the “Schmidt Report”)—as “Enclosures.”
4
 
Therefore, this Report relies entirely upon statements made by 
U.S. government agents (whether FBI agents, DOD employees, or ci-
vilian contractors serving as employees and agents of the DOD).  All 
of the complaints cited in this Report, to the extent it is possible to 
discern them, describe the actions of DOD interrogators as witnessed 
by FBI agents who were present.
5
  The present Report does not ad-
dress any allegations that have been raised only by detainees.
6
 
Thus, this Report does not attempt to document all detainee 
abuse during interrogation. (That information has been published by 
others with greater access to unredacted reports.) Rather, this Report 
 
1 (2005) [hereinafter SCHMIDT REPORT], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050714report.pdf.  
 3 Id. 
 4 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SCHMIDT-FURLOW REPORT ENCLOSURES (2005) [hereinafter 
ENCLOSURES], available at http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/ 
061906/Schmidt_FurlowEnclosures.pdf. 
     The documents that are relied upon in this Report represent only a small part of 
the approximately 100,000 documents released as a result of a Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA) application by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).  See Doc-
uments Released Under FOIA, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/torturefoia.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2011) 
[hereinafter FOIA Documents].  The identification of the documents crucial to this 
Report was, in large part, the result of the research and investigation conducted by 
Matthew Darby, Daniel Mann, and, above all, Megan Sassaman. 
 5 This Report refers to military police conduct only when such conduct is at the 
behest of an interrogator. 
 6 Most of the documents cited in this Report were obtained by the ACLU 
through FOIA litigation.  See FOIA Documents, supra note 4.  The United States gov-
ernment released a minority of the documents cited in this Report. 
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shows what information FBI agents at Guantánamo recorded and 
sent up the chain of command to headquarters.  From this informa-
tion, it is possible to determine what FBI Headquarters and the DOD 
knew—and what they did—about detainee mistreatment during in-
terrogations. 
The documents analyzed in this Report were culled from over 
100,000 pages of documents that have been produced as a result of 
FOIA litigation.
7
  While the majority of these documents describe 
conduct in Afghanistan and Iraq, this Report analyzes only those 
documents describing Defense Department interrogators’ mistreat-
ment of detainees at Guantánamo. 
Most of these documents—which include both the solicited and 
unsolicited reports evaluated in this Report—consist primarily of 
emails sent from FBI agents to senior FBI officials.  The government 
has heavily redacted these documents.  In almost all cases, dates and 
names have been withheld; in many cases, substantive information 
has also been redacted.  In fact, of the 251 solicited and unsolicited 
responses ultimately reviewed in this Report, more than 40% were so 
heavily redacted that more than half of the original document’s con-
tent remains obscured.  More than 15% of these documents contain 
full-page redactions or appear to be missing entire pages, and more 
than 25% refer to appendices that have not been released.  Redacted 
documents are difficult to catalog without errors, but duplicative 
documents were eliminated from this Report’s analysis to the greatest 
extent possible.  Some documents were entirely redacted and are 
thus impossible to review; those are not reported here. 
In contrast to the FBI agents’ individual reports, the Schmidt 
Report addresses interrogators’ conduct only generally.
8
  The present 
Report examines the Schmidt Report as it was presented to Congress, 
and it also considers the reports “Enclosures”: a collection of notes 
and documents from Lieutenant General Randall M. Schmidt’s inves-
tigation
9
 compiled for an unknown purpose and appended to the 
Schmidt Report without comment.  The Enclosures consist primarily 
of summaries of interviews with FBI agents, Defense Department in-
 
 7 See id. 
 8 See SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 2. 
 9 See Memorandum from Bantz J. Craddock, Gen. U.S. Army, for Lieutenant 
Gen. Randall M. Schmidt, USAF (Dec. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Craddock Memo], in 
ENCLOSURES, supra note 4, at 768, 
 available at http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/061906/ 
Schmidt_FurlowEnclosures.pdf. 
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terrogators, and senior Defense Department officials.
10
  Also included 
among the Enclosures are interrogation logs and memoranda regard-
ing torture allegations. 
In spite of the Schmidt Report’s ambiguity—and despite the 
government’s heavy redactions of other documents relied upon by 
this Report—an analysis of publicly available data reveals a much 
greater breadth of alleged Defense Department misconduct than is 
addressed by the Schmidt Report, notwithstanding that General 
Schmidt was personally aware of (or could have easily discovered) all 
of the misconduct that is discussed in the present Report. 
II. THE EARLY YEARS: FBI REPORTS MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES BY 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTERROGATORS 
Beginning in 2002, FBI agents witnessed conduct by DOD inter-
rogators at Guantánamo that compelled several agents to document 
their complaints in reports to FBI administrators.  These unsolicited 
complaints, which, the agents alleged, were met by Defense Depart-
ment personnel with indifference,
11
 describe actions performed by 
Defense Department personnel that include beatings as well as ex-
ploitation of detainees’ religious beliefs and sexuality.
12  Other types 
of misconduct alleged in the FBI agents’ unsolicited complaints in-
clude hoodings,
13
 denial of food and water,
14
 sleep deprivation,
15
 
 
 10 ENCLOSURES, supra note 4. 
 11 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SCHMIDT-FURLOW REPORT, DEFERRED 3770 [herei-
nafter SCHMIDT-FURLOW DEFERRED], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/legaldocuments/july_docs/(M)%20SCHMIDT-
FURLOW%20DEFERRED.pdf (“We talked to him (Mr. [REDACTED]) several dif-
ferent times to let him know that we objected to the use of dogs and that we did not 
do business that way.  It was an inappropriate measure.  He told us that we 
([REDACTED] and I) were guests and we should act accordingly.” (alterations in 
original)). 
 12 See E-mail from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] (July 31, [REDACTED], avail-
able at http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/022306/2600.pdf  (“Last evening 
I went to observe an interview of [REDACTED] with [REDACTED].  The adjoining 
room, observable from the monitoring booth, was occupied by 2 DHS investigators 
showing a detainee homosexual porn movies and using a strobe light in the room.  
We moved our interview to a different room.” (alterations in original)). 
 13 E-mail from [REDACTED], Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to [REDACTED], 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation (May 5, 2004, 08:50 AM), available at 
http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/022306/2715.pdf 
 (“Based on Rumsfeld’s public statements, DOD is against hooding prisoners, threats 
of violence and techniques meant to humiliating detainees (there is a list I have 
seen).  I know these techniques were approved at high levels w/in DOD and used on 
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED].”(alterations in original)). 
 14 E-mail from [REDACTED], Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to [REDACTED], 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation (May 5, 2004, 11:04 AM), available at 
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threats,
16
 wrapping detainees in Israeli flags,
17
 the use of dogs,
18
 strobe 
lights,
19
 loud noises,
20
 and extreme temperatures.
21
 
The FBI agents’ unsolicited complaints not only describe alleged 
misconduct by DOD interrogators, but also articulate specific reasons 
for concern with their interrogation tactics.  One agent summarized 
the popular sentiment among agents as follows: “These tactics have 
produced no intelligence of a threat neutralization nature to date 
and CITF [Criminal Investigation Task Force] believes that [sic] 
techniques have destroyed any chance of prosecuting this detainee.”
22
 
 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/FBI%204985-4987.pdf (“During 
the 12 hours [REDACTED] was not permitted to eat, pray, or use the bathroom.”).  
 15 Memorandum from [REDACTED] to Wiley, Special Agent in Charge, 
[REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) [hereinafter Wiley Memo], available at 
http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/022306/2561.pdf. 
 16 Memorandum from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) [herei-
nafter FBI 4645–4647], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/FBI_4645_4647.pdf  (“Agents have 
seen documentary evidence that a detainee was told that his family had been taken 
into custody and would be moved to Morocco for interrogation if he did not begin to 
talk.”). 
 17 E-mail from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] (July 31, [REDACTED], 12:53 
PM), available at http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/022306/2600.pdf   
[hereinafter Detainee 2600] (“[U]sing tactics as described above and others [such 
as]wrapping in Israeli flag . . . .”)). 
 18 FBI 4645–4647, supra note 16 (“Agents [were]aware of detainees being threat-
ened (either in person or aurally) by dogs.”).  
 19 Detainee 2600, supra note 17 (noting that agent observed two DHS investiga-
tors using a strobe light). 
 20 Wiley Memo, supra note 15 (“BAU personnel witnessed . . . utilization of loud 
music . . . .”). 
 21 Detainee 2600, supra note 17 (noting the use of change in temperatures). 
 22 E-mail from [REDACTED] to Gary Bald et al., Fed. Bureau of Investigation 
(Dec. 5, 2003, 09:53 AM)[hereinafter Bald E-mail], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI.121504.3977.pdf; see also Memoran-
dum from Behavioral Analyst Unit, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Raymond S. Mey 
et al., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (May 30, 2003) [hereinafter BAU Memo], availa-
ble at http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/022306/1261.pdf. 
[S]everal discussions were held to determine the most effective means 
of conducting interview of detainees: These discussions were prompted 
by the recognition that members of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 
(DIA) Defense Humint Services (DHS) were being encouraged at 
times to use aggressive interrogation tactics in GTMO which are of 
questionable effectiveness . . . . Not only are these tactics at odds with 
legally permissible interviewing techniques used by U.S. law enforce-
ment agencies . . . but they are being employed by personnel in GTMO 
who appear to have little, if any, experience eliciting information for 
judicial purposes.  The continued use of these techniques has the po-
tential of negatively impacting future interviews by FBI agents as they 
attempt to gather intelligence and prepare cases for prosecution. 
Id. 
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From the beginning, FBI agents expressed concerns that De-
fense Department interrogation tactics produced unreliable and in-
admissible intelligence.  In their unsolicited complaints alone, the 
agents described thirteen incidents in which the Defense Depart-
ment’s interrogation techniques were likely to produce unreliable in-
telligence, four incidents in which the techniques were likely to be 
counterproductive, and three incidents in which the interrogation 
techniques were deemed likely to raise admissibility issues for the 
FBI.  “In my weekly meetings with DOJ we often discussed 
[REDACTED] techniques and how they were not effective or produc-
ing intel that was reliable.”
23
 
A. Impersonating the FBI 
One Defense Department interrogation technique of particular 
concern to the agents was the DOD interrogators’ practice of posing 
as FBI agents during interrogations.  Two agents expressed this con-
cern.  One stated the following: 
We’ve heard that DHS [Department of Homeland Security] inter-
rogators routinely identify themselves as FBI Agents and then in-
terrogate a detainee for 16–18 hours using tactics as described 
above and others (wrapping in Israeli flag, constant loud music, 
cranking the A/C down, etc).  The next time a real Agent tries to 
talk to that guy, you can imagine the result.24 
Another expressed similar sentiment: “If this detainee is ever released 
or his story made public in any way, DOD interrogators will not be 
held accountable because these torture techniques were done [by] 
the ‘FBI’ interrogators.  The FBI will be left holding the bag before 
the public.”
25
  Agents voiced concern with the DOD’s practice of FBI 
agent impersonation in at least fourteen of their unsolicited com-
plaints. 
When FBI agents at Guantánamo expressed their objections to 
the treatment of detainees during interrogation, the complaints were 
met with indifference or blunt dismissal.  For example, “We talked to 
him (Mr. [REDACTED]) several different times to let him know that 
we objected to the use of dogs and that we did not do business that 
 
 23 E-mail from [REDACTED], Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to T.J. Harrington, 
Fed. Bureau of Investigation (May 10, 2004, 12:26 PM)(alteration in original), availa-
ble at http://www.aclu.org/files/projects/foiasearch/pdf/DOJFBI003085.pdf. 
 24 Detainee 2600, supra note 17.  The Schmidt Report addresses the impersona-
tion issue; it states that FBI impersonations were discontinued because “[t]he tech-
nique, while authorized, was undermining the inter-agency working relationship.”  
SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 2, at 7. 
 25 Bald E-mail, supra note 22.  
DENBEAUX & DENBEAUX_TORTURE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2011  2:38 PM 
2011] TORTURE, WHO KNEW? 1325 
way.  It was an inappropriate measure.  He told us that we 
([REDACTED] and I) ‘were guests and we should act accordingly.’”
26
 
The FBI agents’ concerns were not limited to the practices of 
low-level DOD interrogators but, in fact, extended to some of the de-
partment’s most senior officials.  One agent, for example, cited the 
following specific concerns with the practices of Major General 
Geoffrey Miller: 
From what cnn reports, gen karpinsky at Abu Gharib said that gen 
miller came to the prison several months ago and told her they 
wanted to “gitmotize” abu ghraib.  I am not sure what this means.  
However, if this refers to intell gathering as I suspect, it suggests 
he has continued to support interrogation strategies we not only 
advised against, but questioned in terms of effectiveness.  Yester-
day, however, we were surprised to read an article in stars and 
stripers, in which gen miller is quoted as saying that he believes in 
the rapport-building approach.  This is not what he was saying at 
gtmo when I was there.  [REDACTED] and I did cart wheels.  The 
battles fought in gitmo while gen miller he was there are on the 
record.
27
 
General Miller was transferred to Iraq in the spring of 2004, and told 
the head of the military prison system that he was going to “Gitmoize” 
Iraq.
28
  The Abu Ghraib scandal broke thereafter.
29
 
 
 26 See SCHMIDT-FURLOW DEFERRED, supra note 11, at 3770 (alteration in origi-
nal)(emphasis added). 
 27 E-mail from [REDACTED], to [REDACTED] (May 13, 2004, 3:42 PM) (em-
phasis added) (inconsistent capitalization and alterations in original), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/FBI%204140.pdf; see also BAU 
Memo, supra note 22, at 4. 
The military and DHS’s inaccurate portrayal to the Pentagon that the 
BAU had endorsed and, in fact, helped to create DHS’s interrogation 
plan for [REDACTED] prompted SSA [REDACTED], SSA 
[REDACTED] and the FBI on-scene TDY operations supervisor, SSA 
[REDACTED] to send a letter (Encl 9) to MGEN Miller correcting 
these misstatements and requesting an opportunity to address the mat-
ter with MGEN Miller in person.  During a subsequent meeting be-
tween MGEN Miller and SSAs [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] de-
tails and rationale for the BAU’s interviewing approach were 
presented.  Although MGEN Miller acknowledged positive aspects of 
this approach, it was apparent that he favored DHS’s interrogation me-
thods, despite FBI assertions that such methods could easily result in 
the elicitation of unreliable and legally inadmissible information. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 28 Scott Wilson & Sewell Chan, As Insurgency Grew, So Did Prison Abuse, WASH. 
POST, May 10, 2004, at A1.  General Miller later did not recall using the word “Gitmo-
ize.”  R. Jeffrey Smith & Josh White, General Asserts She Was Overruled on Prison Moves, 
WASH. POST, May 12, 2004, at A1. 
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III. AFTER ABU GHRAIB 
Immediately after the Abu Ghraib abuses became public in 2004, 
the FBI sent an email to all agents stationed in Iraq requesting infor-
mation regarding detainee abuses.  FBI General Counsel Valerie E. 
Caproni later sent a modified version of this email to all agents who 
had ever been stationed at Guantánamo: “[Agents] who observed ag-
gressive treatment . . . which was not consistent with Bureau interview poli-
cy/guidelines, should respond via email for the purpose of a followup 
[sic] interview.”30 
While many FBI agents responded to the formal solicitation,
31
 a 
majority of the unsolicited complaints previously raised between 2002 
and 2004 do not appear to have been resubmitted.  However, the 
complaints submitted by FBI agents in response to the formal July 
2004 solicitation described many of the same types of interrogation 
techniques as did the agents’ unsolicited complaints, including: isola-
tion,
32
 hoodings,
33
 stress positions,
34
 sleep deprivation,
35
 and religious 
 
 29 Editorial, A System of Abuse, WASH. POST, May 5, 2004, at A28 (“The result of 
[Congress’s] inaction and of the administration’s refusal to respond to previous re-
ports of abuses is the scandal of Abu Ghraib, which has done incalculable damage to 
the U.S. position in Iraq and around the world.”). 
 30 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DETAINEES POSITIVE RESPONSES 3, 4 (2004) (em-
phasis added) [hereinafter POSITIVE RESPONSES], available at http://vault.fbi.gov/ 
Guantanamo%20/Guantanamo%20Part%201%20of%201/view. 
 31 Of the 532 FBI employees and contractors listed by the Counterterrorism Divi-
sion as having served in Guantánamo during this time frame, only 434 submitted 
responses to the July 2004 solicitation.  See id.  Thus, almost twenty percent of those 
whose response were formally solicited did not respond.   
 32 E.g., id. at 258 (“[O]ne detainee was kept in the cell in isolation for an ex-
tended period of time, I think up to 30 days.”); see also id. at 25 (“When 
[REDACTED] arrived in GTMO, number [REDACTED] was incarcerated in a dar-
kened cell in the Naval Brig.” (alterations in original)). 
 33 E.g., id. at  253 (“A detainee was led into an interview room by hooded MPs.  
The detainee was also hooded and the hood was removed by the MPs for the inter-
view.”). 
 34 E.g., id. at 62 (“[D]uring the summer of 2002, [REDACTED] walked into a 
camp Delta observation room and noticed a detainee in an interview room . . . hand-
cuffed with cuffs chained to his waist.  [REDACTED] advised the chains were ad-
justed to force the detainee to stand in a ‘baseball catcher’ position.” (alterations in 
original)). 
 35 E.g., id. at 260–61.  
During my assignment at GTMO I received a briefing from the military 
personnel assigned to operations at GTMO, the non-cooperative detai-
nees could be placed on a list for a specific interrogation technique in-
volving interruption of sleep pattern, called the “frequent flyer pro-
gram.”  With this particular technique, identified detainees were 
moved frequently from cell block to cell block at intervals that ap-
peared to be every hour or every two hours depending on the shifts 
and the availability of military personnel to move the detainee.  Detai-
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and sexual imagery.
36
  One account, for instance, describes the forced 
baptism of a seventeen-year-old detainee: “Another interrogator . . . 
bragged about making Detainee #114 listen to satanic black metal 
music for hours and hours.  Then the interrogator dressed as a Cath-
olic Priest and baptized the detainee in order t[o] save him.”
37
  Many 
other complaints, such as the one that follows, describe the use of a 
combination of these and other techniques: 
On a couple of occasions, I entered interview rooms to find a de-
tainee chained hand and foot in a fetal position to the floor, with 
no chair, food, or water.  Most times they had urinated or defa-
cated [sic] on themselves, and had been left there for 18, 24 
hours or more.  On one occassion [sic], the air conditioning had 
been turned down so far and the temperature was so cold in the 
room, that the barefooted detainee was shaking with cold.  When 
I asked the MP’s [sic] what was going on, I was told that interroga-
tors from the day prior had ordered this treatment, and the de-
tainee was not to be moved.  On another occassion [sic], the A/C 
had been turned off, making the temperature in the unventilated 
room probably well over 100 degrees.  The detainee was almost 
 
nees were moved along with all of their personal belongings.  Due to 
the movement to different cells the detainees had their sleep inter-
rupted throughout a 24 hour period.  
Id. 
I occasionally saw sleep deprivation interviews with strobe lights and 
two different kinds of loud music.  I asked one of the interrogators 
what they were doing [and] they said that it would take approximately 
four days to break someone doing an interrogation 16 hours on with 
the lights and music and four hours off.  The sleep deprivation and the 
lights and alternating beats of the music would wear the detainee 
down.  There was a time period where the interrogations were obtru-
sive enough that the interview rooms for an entire trailer were not 
available if one of these techniques were being utilized. 
Id. at 44. 
 36 E.g., id. at 247–48 (“[D]etainees advised me that they had been subjected to 
loud music to keep them awake and had been shown pornographic photos in an ef-
fort to upset them. . . . [T]hese were techniques used by Department of Defense 
(DOD) contract interviewers.  This was common knowledge among FBI employees 
and it was a topic as I recall that was discussed at staff meetings because it was some-
times detrimental to our efforts of attempting to establish rapport with detainees.”); 
see also id. at 188 (“At that time I saw another detainee sitting on the floor of the in-
terview room with an Israeli flag draped around him, loud music being played and a 
strobe light flashing.  I left the room immediately after seeing this activity.”). 
 37 SCHMIDT-FURLOW DEFERRED, supra note 11, at 3758; see also POSITIVE RESPONSES, 
supra note 30, at 46.  Yussef Mohammed Mubarak Al Shihri, ISN 114, was born on 
September 8, 1985.  U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LIST OF INDIVIDUALS DETAINED BY THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OF GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA FROM JANUARY 2002 THROUGH 
MAY 15, 2006 (2006), available at 
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/Detainee/detaineesFOIArelea
se15May2006.pdf. 
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unconscious on the floor, with a pile of hair next to him.  He had 
apparently been literally pulling his own hair out throughout the 
night.  On another occassion [sic], not only was the temperature 
unbearably hot, but extremely loud rap music was being played in 
the room, and had been since the day before, with the detainee 
chained hand and foot in the fetal position on the tile floor.38 
Some of the agents’ accounts, such as the one that follows, al-
leged that detainees were denied food and water: 
Sometime in the second or third week of February of 2004, 
[REDACTED] was taken to reservation.  ([REDACTED] was on 
both FBI and NAE hold.)  He . . . was yelled at for 25 minutes, 
[REDACTED] was short-shackled, the room temperature was sig-
nificantly lowered, strobe lights were used, and possibly loud mu-
sic. . . .  After the initial 25 minutes of yelling, [REDACTED] was 
left alone in the room in this condition for approximately 12 
hours. . . .  During the 12 hours, [REDACTED] was not permitted 
to eat, pray, or use the bathroom.
39
 
Other accounts described harmful physical conduct: 
When the detainee was brought in for the interview, 
[REDACTED] observed the detainee had a black eye, facial cuts 
around the nose area, and his fingers on both hands were taped 
up.  The detainee, who spoke English, said words to the effect 
[of] “they,” motioning to the Military Police (MP) guards, had 
done this to him.  A Colonel in charge of the MPs, whose name 
[REDACTED] could not recall, advised that the detainee’s inju-
ries were sustained in a scuffle due to the detainee becoming non-
compliant and had to be brought into compliance by a Rapid Re-
sponse Team.
40
 
Still another complaint described how one physically ill detainee vo-
mited repeatedly during his fifteen-hour long interrogation: 
[REDACTED] was being debriefed for several hours (approx-
imately 15 hours) by NAE [the DOD’s North Africa-Europe 
team].  Throughout the session, [REDACTED] periodically threw 
up in a trash can.  At the time, I was told he had an ulcer and that 
the stress was irritating it.  I was later advised he had a stomach vi-
 
 38 POSITIVE RESPONSES, supra note 30, at 10. 
 39 Id. at 214 (alterations in original); see also id. at 12.  
(“On a couple of occasions, I entered interview rooms to find a detainee chained 
hand and foot in a fetal position to the floor, with no chair, food, or water.  Most 
times they had urinated or defecated on themselves, and had been left there for 18, 
24 hours or more.  On one occasion. . . . I was told that interrogators from the day 
prior had ordered this treatment, and the detainee was not to be moved.”). 
 40 Id. at 82 (alterations in original). 
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rus.  I was told he had been given a shot of Motrin (or something 
like that) by the medical staff.
41
 
While the agents’ solicited complaints are very similar in content 
to their unsolicited complaints, there are fewer references to general 
abuse/torture among the complaints that were formally solicited by 
the FBI.  One possible explanation for this is that the formal solicita-
tion (whether intentionally or inadvertently) limited the scope of 
agents’ responses.  One agent, for instance, submitted the following 
query upon receiving the formal solicitation: “I observed what may 
have been aggressive techniques used by non-FBI interrogators.  Does 
this still fall into what you are looking into?”
42  The agent’s confusion 
highlights the solicitation’s ambiguity, and it is difficult to estimate 
what information may have been withheld as a result. 
The FBI agents reported that their ability to observe the DOD 
interrogation techniques was limited.  For example, agents reported 
that although there were eight interrogation rooms in each trailer, 
two of the eight were off limits to the FBI agents.
43
  The agents also 
reported that sometimes entire trailers were off limits to FBI agents 
during interrogation.  For instance, one agent stated that “[o]ften 
DOD personnel would reserve an entire trailer when employing ag-
gressive interview techniques . . . .”
44
  The FBI investigation into the 
agents’ formally solicited reports began on July 9, 2004, and was 
completed on September 23, 2004.
45
   
VI. WHAT SENIOR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS KNEW 
There is some confusion as to when the FBI first formally alerted 
the DOD to reported misconduct toward the detainees by DOD In-
terrogators.  On July 14, 2004, FBI Deputy Director T.J. Harrington 
sent a partial disclosure of the reported abuses to Major General Do-
nald J. Ryder (then Provost Marshall of the Army).
46
  The document 
described and attached two separate complaints, which were initially 
reported in 2002 by FBI agents in Guantánamo to the FBI Headquar-
ters in Washington D.C.
47
  It is possible that the reports were sent at 
 
 41 Id. at 214–15 (first and third alterations in original). 
 42 Id. at 68. 
 43 Id. at 44–49; see also Testimonies of FBI Agents, CTR. FOR STUDY HUM. RTS. AMS., 
http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-
project/testimonies/testimonies-of-fbi-agents/index (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).  
 44 POSITIVE RESPONSES, supra note 30, at 45. 
 45 See generally FOIA Documents, supra note 4. 
 46 Harrington Letter, supra note 1. 
 47 See id. 
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the time they were made; if so, no action was taken on them, thus 
leading to the July 14th report.  It is also possible that the FBI withheld 
this information for almost two years.  In any event, each of the com-
plaints in the email to Major General Ryder alleges serious mistreat-
ment of detainees. 
The first of these complaints describes an instance in which a 
DOD interrogator inflicted physical pain upon a detainee’s hands 
and genitals while the detainee was shackled to the floor and unable 
to protect himself: 
During late 2002, FBI Special Agent [REDACTED] was present in 
an observation room at GTMO and observed [REDACTED] (first 
name unknown) [REDACTED] conducting an interrogation of 
an unknown detainee.  (SA [REDACTED] was present to observe 
the interrogation occurring in a different interrogation room).  
[REDACTED] entered the observation room and complained 
that curtain movement at the observation window was distracting 
the detainee, although no movement of the curtain had occurred.  
She directed a marine to duct tape a curtain over the two-way mir-
ror between the interrogation room and the observation room.  
SA [REDACTED] characterized this action as an attempt to pro-
hibit those in the observation room from witnessing her interac-
tion with the detainee.  Through the surveillance camera moni-
tor, SA [REDACTED] then observed [REDACTED] position 
herself between the detainee and the surveillance camera.  The 
detainee was shackled and his hands were cuffed to his waist.  SA 
[REDACTED] observed [REDACTED] apparently whispering in 
the detainee’s ear, and caressing and applying lotion to his arms 
(this was during Ramadan when physical contact with a woman 
would have been particularly offensive to a Moslem male).  On 
more than one occasion the detainee appeared to be grimacing 
in pain, and [REDACTED]’s hands appeared to be making some 
contact with the detainee.  Although SA [REDACTED] could not 
see her hands at all times, he saw them moving towards the detai-
nee’s lap.  He also observed the detainee pulling away and against 
the restraints.  Subsequently, the marine who had previously 
taped the curtain and had been in the interrogation room with 
[REDACTED] during the interrogation re-entered the observa-
tion room.  SA [REDACTED] asked what had happened to cause 
the detainee to grimace in pain.  The marine said [REDACTED] 
had grabbed the detainee’s thumbs and bent them backwards and 
indicated that she also grabbed his genitals.  The marine also im-
plied that her treatment of that detainee was less harsh than her 
treatment of others by indicating that he had seen her treatment 
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of other detainees result in detainees curling into a fetal position 
on the floor and crying in pain.
48
 
The second complaint contained in General Ryder’s e-mail de-
tails an incident in which a detainee’s mouth was duct-taped for 
chanting the Koran while an amused military employee who applied 
the duct tape watched.
49
 
These FBI complaints appear to be the only unsolicited com-
plaints that the FBI ever forwarded to the DOD.  On December 15, 
2004, the FBI made a formal submission to DOD of all of the res-
ponses that the FBI agents had made to the FBI solicitation of July 9, 
2004.
50
  The FBI submission of December 15th did not include any of 
the unsolicited complaints sent by the FBI agents stationed in Guan-
tánamo while they were actually at Guantánamo. 
There is no evidence that either the FBI or the Defense Depart-
ment did anything with the remainder of the unsolicited complaints. 
 
 48 Id. (alterations in original).  Although the Schmidt Enclosures contains a de-
scription of a similar incident, see ENCLOSURES, supra note 4, at 842, this event is never 
addressed in the Schmidt Report. 
 49 Harrington Letter, supra note 1.  This incident is likely one and the same as a 
similarly described event that appears in the Report.  See SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 
2, at 11–12; see also SCHMIDT-FURLOW DEFERRED, supra note 11, at 3761.  
Agent [REDACTED] and I were watching an FBI interrogation in one 
of the interrogation trailers when [REDACTED] came into the obser-
vation booth.  He was excited and stated that he had something to 
show us.  I was curious, so I followed [REDACTED] down the hallway 
to an interrogation room.  When I arrived at the interrogation room, I 
observed six or seven soldiers (or persons I believed were soldiers) 
laughing and pointing at something inside the room.  When I looked 
inside the room I noticed a detainee with his entire head covered in 
duct tape (except for his eyes and maybe mouth).  I asked 
[REDACTED] why the detainee’s head was covered with duct tape?  
[REDACTED] stated because he (the detainee) refused to stop “chant-
ing the Koran” during an interrogation session.  When I asked 
[REDACTED] how he planned to take the tape off without hurting the 
detainee (the detainee had a beard and longer hair), [REDACTED] 
just laughed.  I immediately informed Agent [REDACTED] and pro-
ceeded to notify the Criminal Investigation task Force attorney (either 
[REDACTED] I don’t think [REDACTED] personally put the duct tape 
on the detainee’s head, but I believe from his actions he directed the 
soldiers to do it. 
Id. (alterations in original). 
 50 SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 2, at 1–3.    
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V. THE SCHMIDT REPORT AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
A. General Schmidt’s Report 
Confronted with the FBI’s solicited complaints, the DOD di-
rected Lieutenant General Randall M. Schmidt to initiate an investi-
gation and draft a response.
51
  General Schmidt’s quite limited task 
was to determine whether an enumerated list of types of conduct de-
scribed in the formally solicited complaints were authorized at any time 
by the Army Field Manual.
52
  The scope of General Schmidt’s investi-
gation was substantially limited by an explicit instruction to ignore 
any “allegations that are the subject of ongoing criminal investiga-
tions by the Army Criminal Investigation Division.”
53
  These investiga-
tions were not public.
54
  The Army released the results of a small 
number of closed investigations, including one that describes how a 
detainee was repeatedly thrown to the floor during an interrogation.
55
  
The Schmidt Report, however, does not mention that a detainee was 
ever thrown to the floor despite the fact that the solicited responses 
included a description of such an incident.
56
 
The resulting report, Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee 
Abuse at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility, asserted that there 
was “no evidence” that “torture or inhumane treatment” occurred at 
Guantánamo, and, further, that only three instances occurred in 
which interrogation acts were “in violation of interrogation tech-
niques authorized by Army Field Manual 34-52 and [DOD] guid-
ance.”
57  The Schmidt Report stated that sufficient evidence did not 
 
 51 Id. at 2–3.  The Defense Department originally assigned this task to Brigadier 
General John T. Furlow, but General Schmidt eventually assumed responsibility for 
the investigation and authored the resulting report.  Id. 
 52 Id. at 3–4 (emphasis added). 
 53 Craddock Memo, supra note 9, in ENCLOSURES, supra note 4 (“You are not to 
investigate allegations that are the subject of ongoing criminal investigations by the 
Army Criminal Investigative Division.”). 
 54 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ARMY CRIM. INVESTIGATION COMMAND, 
http://www.cid.army.mil/faqs.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2011) (“As a matter of poli-
cy, CID does not confirm when someone is the subject or suspect of an ongoing 
criminal investigation due to the person’s Constitutional due process and Privacy Act 
rights.”). 
 55 See Memorandum from [REDACTED], to [REDACTED] (Apr. 25, 2003)(on 
file with author).   
 56 POSITIVE RESPONSES, supra note 30, 71–72.  
 57 SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 2, at 1; see also Kathleen Rhem, Alleged Guantanamo 
Abuse Did Not Rise to Level of ‘Inhumane,’ U.S. DEP’T DEF. (July 13, 2005), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=16651 (“‘I do not, however, con-
sider this treatment to have crossed the threshold of being inhumane,’ Air Force Lt. 
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exist to support agents’ accounts that an interrogator groped a detai-
nee’s genitals or that a detainee pulled his own hair out due to the 
heat.
58
 
The DOD voluntarily released the Schmidt Report, which the 
Defense Department represented as a complete review of allegations 
of mistreatment and abuse at Guantánamo Bay.
59
  The Report has 
since been cited by the Defense Department and members of the Se-
nate Armed Services Committee in support of the proposition that no 
detainee abuse occurred at Guantánamo.
60
 
 
Gen. Randall Schmidt, the senior investigating officer, told members of Senate 
Armed Services Committee.”). 
 58 SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 2, at 12, 22–23. 
 59 See Rhem, supra note 57. 
 60 Id.  The DOD stated that: 
Schmidt’s report constitutes the 12th major review of detainee opera-
tions.  In today’s hearing, Virginia Sen. John Warner noted that the few 
cases of misconduct cited in the report should be viewed in the context 
of roughly 24,000 interrogations conducted at Guantánamo Bay since 
detention operations began there in early 2003. 
Id. 
     Before his publicized exit from the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for De-
tainee Affairs Cully Stimson explained the following position in a January 10, 2007, 
interview on C-SPAN: 
Caller: Hello, I am Andrew from Paramus.  I guess what is disconcert-
ing of Mr. Stimson, is how he brushes aside any concerns of Guantá-
namo and its impact on our foreign policy and the image of the United 
States.  And that is what is concerning to me.  What I would like is spe-
cifically for him to address the FBI agents who have gone to Guantá-
namo.  Saw what was going on there, refused to participate in interro-
gations because of the abuses they saw, and the abuses they continued 
to see.  These aren’t ACLU types, these are FBI agents and I have never 
heard the administration clearly address those concerns.  Thank you. 
Cully Stimson: Um, the administration has addressed those concerns.  
In fact you can go to the DOD website, and read the Schmidt Furlow 
report.  There are no abuses going on now.  In the beginning of Guan-
tánamo, we have been very candid with the public, there were inci-
dents, minor, where people mistreated detainees.  Those incidents 
were investigated. People were held accountable.  The FBI agents are 
not seeing abuses at Guantánamo now.  The Washington Post article 
later, or last week, was somewhat disingenuous in my opinion. . . . In 
2002, in 2003, a FBI agent witnessed interrogation techniques that he 
was unfamiliar with as a law enforcement officer.  He emailed head-
quarters, headquarters didn’t respond, but what happened is, the mili-
tary took it upon itself to investigate those emails, and General Schmidt and 
General Furlow issued a report that is open for the world to see.  It was issued 
about 2 years ago looking into those allegations.  Some were found to be true, 
most were not found to be true.  But you can read it for yourself.  
Interview with Cully Stimson (C-SPAN television broadcast Jan. 10, 2007) (emphasis 
added), available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/BayDetaine. 
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B. Omitted from the Schmidt Report 
The Schmidt Report omitted reference to nearly all of the unso-
licited reports of mistreatment of prisoners, presumably because the 
FBI did not make those reports available to the DOD.  In addition, 
the Schmidt Report failed to address even some of the solicited FBI 
complaints—those that General Schmidt was specifically tasked to re-
view.  Since nothing was publicly known of the FBI’s complaints of 
detainee mistreatment until the Schmidt Report’s publication, how-
ever, it was impossible to know what was missing from the report until 
the ACLU’s FOIA litigation triggered the production of the actual 
FBI complaints. 
The Schmidt Report neither evaluates nor references many of 
the FBI reports that had been forwarded to the Defense Department 
on December 15, 2004.  Specifically, those FBI reports contain at least 
five reports of physical beatings, which the Schmidt Report does not 
address.  For instance, the Schmidt Report makes no mention of the 
following account, which was part of the December 15, 2004, referral: 
When the detainee was brought in for the interview, 
[REDACTED] observed the detainee had a black eye, facial cuts 
around the nose area, and his fingers on both hands were taped 
up.  The detainee, who spoke English, said words to the effect of 
“they,” motioning to the Military Police (MP) guards, had done 
this to him.  A Colonel in charge of the MPs, whose name 
[REDACTED] could not recall, advised that the detainee’s inju-
ries were sustained in a scuffle due to the detainee’s becoming 
non-compliant and had to be brought into compliance by a Rapid 
Response Team.61 
There is a handwritten note on this FBI report (presumably written 
by the FBI official who evaluated the report), which reads: “Why 
would it be necessary/reasonable to break fingers?”
62
 
The Schmidt Report also makes no mention of the following in-
cident, in which a detainee was shown pornography: 
[D]etainees advised me that they had been subjected to loud mu-
sic to keep them awake and had been shown pornographic pho-
tos in an effort to upset them. . . .  these were techniques used by 
Department of Defense (DOD) contract interviewers.  This was 
common knowledge among FBI employees and it was a topic as I 
recall that was discussed at staff meetings because it was some-
 
 61 POSITIVE RESPONSES, supra note 30, at 82 (alterations in original).  
 62 Id. at 81. 
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times detrimental to our efforts of attempting to establish rapport 
with detainees.63 
Additionally, the Schmidt Report fails to address at least four in-
stances of religious abuse, including the following incident, which 
was perpetrated upon a teenaged detainee: “Another interrogator 
(not sure if military or contractor or other) bragged about making 
Detainee # [REDACTED] listen to satanic black metal music for 
hours and hours.  Then the interrogator dressed as a Catholic Priest 
and baptized the detainee in order to save him.”
64
 
Since General Schmidt was instructed to investigate only certain 
types of abuse, and since he was specifically forbidden to address any 
conduct which was currently under criminal investigation, it may not 
be surprising that the Schmidt Report does not address many in-
stances of abuse that FBI agents and others reported.  This might ex-
plain why the Schmidt Report does not mention, for instance, an in-
cident in which an interrogator “went across the desk” at a detainee.
65
  
It is impossible to know which of the reported incidents were “off lim-
its” for General Schmidt’s investigation insofar as they were the sub-
ject of criminal inquiry because no public disclosure of criminal in-
quiries—let alone indictments—has been made as to any of the 
complaints.  Even if General Schmidt were conscientious within the 
parameters of his instructions, it is clear that his resulting report can-
not establish what the report is sometimes said to prove: the absence 
of abuse at Guantánamo. 
There are, however, reasons to doubt the accuracy of the 
Schmidt Report even within its own highly restricted confines. 
C. Buried Complaints: The Schmidt “Enclosures” 
In the course of his investigation into the reports referred by the 
FBI on December 15, 2004, General Schmidt discovered additional 
evidence of improper Defense Department interrogation techniques.  
The additional detainee abuses discovered by General Schmidt in-
cluded the use of dogs, denial of food and water, beatings, threats, 
isolation, disorientation, and at least fifteen incidents of sexual 
 
 63 Id. at 247–48 (alterations in original). 
 64 Id. at 44; see also id. at 188 (“At that time I saw another detainee sitting on the 
floor of the interview room with an Israeli flag draped around him, loud music being 
played and a strobe light flashing.  I left the room immediately after seeing this activ-
ity.”). 
 65 SCHMIDT-FURLOW DEFERRED, supra note 11, at 3744 (“We physically removed an 
FBI agent when he went across the desk at a detainee.”). 
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abuse.66  Yet, General Schmidt did not mention in his published re-
port any of these additional incidents—uncovered by his own investi-
gation—of detainee mistreatment at the hands of the Defense De-
partment. 
Instead, General Schmidt collected these other reports of abuses 
and placed them in a separate file, which he denominated as “Enclo-
sures” and relegated to a separate appendix.
67
  The appendix was 
then excluded from the actual published report, as was any reference 
to the appendix, the “Enclosures” or the underlying abuses them-
selves.  Therefore, these additional reports of abuses were unknown 
and unknowable from the published record, and would have re-
mained hidden but for the FOIA litigation, which ultimately required 
their production. 
General Schmidt not only relegated these findings to an unpub-
lished appendix, but he also failed to mention them in his testimony 
before Congress.
68
  Thus, burying these reports in the unpublished 
appendix meant that neither Congress nor the public was aware that 
General Schmidt and Brigadier General John T. Furlow knew of the 
seventy-nine instances of abuse described in the “Enclosures”—
including the use of dogs, denial of food and water, beatings, threats, 
isolation, disorientation, and at least fifteen incidents of sexual abuse. 
Although the “Enclosures,” along with both the solicited and un-
solicited FBI complaints, generally establish that the use of objection-
able interrogation techniques by the Defense Department was wide-
spread, the Schmidt Report concludes just the opposite—ultimately 
declaring that there was “no evidence of torture or inhumane treat-
ment” at Guantánamo.
69
 
Given that the findings in the “Enclosures” resulted from Gener-
al Schmidt’s own investigation, not only was his testimony to Con-
gress, that no inhumane treatment occurred at Guantánamo, inaccu-
rate, but there was also a reason to question his motivation for 
making a statement so greatly at variance with his own investigation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although FBI agents described hundreds of instances of impro-
per conduct by DOD interrogators at Guantánamo Bay, and senior 
 
 66  See ENCLOSURES, supra note 4. 
 67 ENCLOSURES, supra note 4. 
 68 See Hearing on Guantanamo Bay Detainee Treatment before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 
108th Cong. (2005) (statement of Lieutenant Gen., U.S. Air Force, Randall 
Schmidt). 
 69 SCHMIDT REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. 
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FBI officials were privy to such reports as early as 2002, the FBI did 
not confront the DOD with the agents’ complaints until more than 
two years later, in 2004. Even then, the FBI provided the department 
with less than half of those complaints.  In response, the Defense De-
partment produced a staggeringly incomplete and therefore inaccu-
rate report—upon which Congress has relied—that summarily con-
cludes that there was “no evidence of torture or inhumane treatment 
at Guantánamo.”
70
 
 
 
 70 Id.  
